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John Banville’s “Overman”: Intertextual dialogues  
with Friedrich Nietzsche in Shroud
Mehdi Ghassemi
Université de Lille
Résumé
Cet article propose de lire Shroud (2003) de John Banville comme exemple qui illustre le 
mieux le dialogue de l’écrivain avec la philosophie de Friedrich Nietzsche. Cette étude tente de 
retracer les manières dont le narrateur incorpore et ensuite réinvente la notion Nietzschéenne 
de l’homme (Übermensch) à travers de ses métaphores élaborées. Ce projet soutient également 
que c’est bien Nietzsche qui fournit finalement au narrateur banvillean l’outil nécessaire pour 
encadrer une conception du “moi” qui serait immune à la crise linguistique proposée par la 
déconstruction.
Mots clés: Banville, Shroud, Nietzsche, authenticité, déconstruction
Abstract
This paper proposes to read John Banville’s Shroud (2003) as an example that most aptly illus-
trates the writer’s dialogue with the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. It traces the ways in which 
Banville’s narrator incorporates Nietzsche’s conception of self and demonstrates how Banville rein-
vents Nietzsche’s idea of the Overman through elaborate metaphors. It argues that it is Nietzsche 
who ultimately provides Banville’s narrator with the necessary tool to frame a sense of selfhood that 
lies outside the linguistic predicament posited by deconstruction.
Keywords: Banville, Shroud, Nietzsche, authenticity, deconstruction
•  Introduction
A defining aspect of John Banville’s fiction is his narrators’ preoccupation 
with the nature of their subjective experience as well as the (in)authenticity of 
their perceptions and representations. Often staged as first-person autobiogra-
phers, these narrators strive to find a way to explore and simultaneously enhance 
knowing and being. These concerns turn their narratives into extended interro-
gations of the relation between reality and imagination, on the one hand, and 
explorations of the (im)possibility of authentic subjective experience. Among the 
more recent publications, notably, Eoghan Smith’s John Banville: Art and Authen-
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ticity (2013) and Elke D’hoker’s Visions of Alterity (2004), deal with these issues 
extensively. At the same time, the Banvillian narrator is fully aware that there is 
no way out of language, that he is forever imprisoned by it, that language, as a 
system in its own right, imposes its rules, out of which there is no meaning. In the 
absence of direct access to “reality” these narrators embark on a journey of subjec-
tivity in search of reality and stable self through writing and reminiscence. This, 
too, of course has been recognized by the majority of Banville scholars. Laura 
Izzara, for instance, rightly considers Banville a “critical writer” whose fiction 
“lies on the border between two genres, the novel and critical theory”1. Moreo-
ver, far from indulging a “postmodern” sense of liberation following the decons-
truction of truth and stable self, Banville’s protagonists seem to demonstrate a 
feeling of disappointment, if not disillusionment. To put it in Joseph McMinn’s 
words, although “Banville can deconstruct with the best of them,” “the expo-
sure of constructed myths about identity and nature” is never “a simple cause for 
celebration”2. Rather, as John Kenny has it, it is a “modernist nostalgia misplaced 
in a postmodernist chaotic world”3.
Banville’s fiction, in this sense, is in constant search for an aesthetic expres-
sion that can adequately match his narrators’ epistemological crisis. It is an evol-
ving philosophical fiction that, ever since Gabriel Godkin’s struggle with finding 
“the thing in itself ”4 in Birchwood, has gone through various phases of concern. 
Although these questions have stayed constant throughout Banville’s oeuvre in 
one way or another, his fiction has very broadly moved from language and science 
in the seventies and metaphysics, art and ethics in the eighties to poststructura-
list literary theory in his later period. Over the years, these shifts have resulted in 
an extraordinary number of perspectives and the quantity of the scholarly work 
devoted to Banville’s fiction alone is a testimony to how fertile these perspectives 
have been.
The aim of the present study is to examine Shroud as a key text from Banville’s 
later period in which the writer offers his most vivid engagement with deconstruc-
tion, on the one hand, and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, on the other. 
As the second book of a trilogy (together with Eclipse and Ancient Light) Shroud 
features Axel Vander, an aging literary theorist residing in the United States, grap-
pling with his wife’s death as well as his difficult past. After receiving a letter from 
Cass Cleave who threatens to expose his “true” identity as an imposter, Vander 
leaves for Europe to meet his exposer during a conference in Italy. His life, work, 
1.  Laura Patrícia Zuntini Izarra, Mirrors and Holographic Labyrinths: the Process of a “New” Aesthetic Synthesis in The 
Novels of John Banville, International Scholars Publications, 1999, p. 159.
2.  Joseph McMinn, The Supreme Fictions of John Banville, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 7.
3.  John Kenny, John Banville, Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2009, p. 15.
4.  John Banville, Birchwood, London, Picador, 1998, p. 13.
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and controversial past are informed by that of Paul de Man’s—one of the founders 
of deconstruction. Yet, Banville’s mise en scene of de Man’s life in Shroud is at best 
very loose. Unlike de Man, Vander’s past is not revealed posthumously, but during 
his lifetime. Moreover, Vander and de Man do not entirely share the same secret. 
While de Man’s reputation has been tarnished by his anti- Semitic articles written 
at a young age under Nazi occupation, Axel’s ultimate secret is that he had purloi-
ned the identity of the person who wrote the problematic articles. Most signifi-
cantly, perhaps, Vander openly confesses his secret in his narrative—something de 
Man never did (at least directly) in his lifetime.
Alongside de Man, Friedrich Nietzsche is the other strong presence in Shroud. 
Turin, where much of Shroud takes place is also the city where Nietzsche lived and 
finally went mad. What is more, Vander and Cass Cleave visit the philosopher’s 
house during their stay in the city. Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy has long appealed 
to Banville’s narrators, at least since Freddie Montgomery’s Nietzschean extra-moral 
stance in The Book of Evidence.5 Yet, this paper argues, it is in Shroud that Banville 
articulates his most sophisticated version of Nietzsche’s Overman. Through elabo-
rate metaphors Banville creates an intertextual dialogue with Nietzsche’s concep-
tion of the self, one that ultimately provides his narrator with the necessary tool to 
capture (or frame) a sense of selfhood that lies outside the linguistic predicament 
posited by de Man. It starts by examining the way in which the discourse of auto-
biography fails to produce a coherent sense of self in Vander’s narrative and, instead 
deprives him of a sense of “presence” and reduces him to a spectre. Moreover, in this 
section, Jacques Lacan’s conception of Symbolic existence is mobilized to aid us in 
understanding Vander’s problematic identity. As such, the first part sets the scene 
for Vander’s two-fold recourse to Nietzsche in order to salvage a sense of self. The 
second part of the paper thus traces the ways in which Vander, following Nietzsche, 
incorporates the body as part and parcel of his project to capture the ever-elusive 
self. Finally, the third section demonstrates how Banville reinvents Nietzsche’s 
conception of the Overman as a being located at an “edge” via complex and creative 
tropes. Here, Lacan’s crucial distinction between reality and the Real will also prove 
fruitful as it enables us to elaborate on the significance of Banville’s Nietzschean 
move in its complexity, ambition and scope.
5.  In a recent interview Banville confirms: “Nietzsche is my philosopher—is my poet. I can find few things in his 
work, and I’ve read most of it, that I disagree with” (Hedwig Schwall, “Interview of John Banville with Hedwig 
Schwall”, The ESSE Messenger, 26 (2), 2017, p. 74). 
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•  Inauthenticity, lack of presence
Axel explains the aim of his narrative in the opening pages of his narrative: 
“I am going to explain myself, to myself ”6, echoing Nietzsche’s announcement 
“And so I tell my life to myself ” in the semi-autobiographical Ecce Homo7. Jacques 
Derrida reads the latter in his Otobiographies according to which the autobiogra-
pher first and foremost “tells himself this life and he is the narration’s first, if not 
its only, addressee and destination—within the text”8. As Robert Smith com-
ments, autobiography is related to “auto-affection” as a process of solipsistic self-
containment achieved in “hearing oneself speak”9. The latter entails a process via 
which the subject creates a close circuit between the mouth and the ear, resulting 
in a “solipsistic umbilicus of completion”10. The most  “categorical” by-product 
of hearing oneself speak, says Smith, is the sense of self-presence11. Nevertheless, 
for the process of hearing oneself speak to be effective in producing presence one 
must inevitably produce speech from the mouth to ear. In other words, utterances 
must be verbalized, expressed as well as ex-pressed (pushed outside), so they can 
be heard. The message has to be first “detached at large” for it to be received by 
the ear. In this sense, the process cannot be an entirely closed circuit, but instead, 
always partly open and exposed12. It is exposed to what Derrida calls the “aleatory 
or chance elements at work in every kind of message”13. That is to say, for subjec-
tivity to exist, a discourse of exchange must be established through verbalization, 
one that is never fully self-contained but irrevocably mediated. The self-unity 
solipsistic umbilicus solipsistic umbilicus of the speaking/writing “I” is marred 
precisely because by uttering, I exposes itself to the other, the you, the generic 
interlocutor. Consequently, the self can no longer be the sole proprietor of the 
message. Rather, by addressing oneself, the I also addresses “an antecedent you”, 
a “not yet anthropomorphized you”, an irreducible otherness whose existence 
provides the very condition of possibility of the I’s verbal auto-correspondence14. 
According to Derrida, in autobiography the “text is signed only much later by 
the other”, “it is the ear of the other that signs”15. This is why autobiography is in 
fact “Otobiographie”, a text destined to be received and endorsed by the other’s ear 
6.  John Banville, Shroud, London, Picador, 2002, p. 5.
7.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trad, R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992, p. 74.
8.  Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, Peggy Kamuf (trans.), New York, 
Schocken Books, 1985, p. 13.
9.  Robert Smith, Derrida and Autobiography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 76.
10.  Ibid.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid., p. 78.
13.  Jacques Derrida, op. cit., p. 108.
14.  Robert Smith, op. cit., p. 78.
15.  Jacques Derrida, op. cit., p. 50-1.
John Banville’s “Overman”: Intertextual dialogues with Friedrich Nietzsche in Shroud
• 163
(Oto-). The latter provides the ground on which the autobiographical signature 
takes hold, the agent for whom the process of signing is performed.
In Shroud, the narrator hears himself breathe rather than speak: “I heard 
myself breathing in the mouthpiece”16; “I could hear myself breathe”17. It is 
not so much his speech Axel hears, not a textual message, not even a voice, but 
a shadowy sound of air. The process of hearing-oneself-speak in Axel’s narrative 
does very little in creating a subjective loop, a closed circuit between mouth and 
ear as a result of which he can achieve self-presence. In fact, presence is preci-
sely what he lacks. Like the air he breathes, he is transparent: Cass is depicted as 
“looking through me as though I were not there”18 and his “presence did nothing 
to tone down the rabid talk”19. In parallel, after admitting to having stolen the 
name “Axel Vander”, the narrator never discloses his real name throughout the 
novel. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, the proper name functions as a signi-
fier that guarantees the subject a unique space in the Symbolic order, that is, 
according to Lacan, “the locus of the signifier”20, the register that guaranties the 
possibility of any meaningful signification. The proper name thus serves as a sin-
gular point, which defines one’s singularity as a speaking (existing) subject. Never-
theless, adopting a Symbolic identity entails giving up something irreducible to 
the Symbolic because the latter is not a complete system. In fact, one can never 
be reduced to his/her Symbolic “existenceexistence”. Therefore, adopting a Sym-
bolic identity always involves a splitting that divides the subject into his/her Sym-
bolic existence, on the one hand, and the Real, the aspect of his/her being that 
lies beyond Symbolization21. The subject is thus required to make a sacrifice with 
regards to his/her (Real) “substance”. S/he has to give away “something” so that s/
he can have a place in/through the SymbolicOther. This is why his/her (Symbolic) 
existence will always be marked by a lack, a negativity.
Therefore, one can postulate, by not giving his “true” name, Shroud’s nar-
rator aims at resisting the name’s Symbolic splitting. Insofar as he is unnamed, 
the narrator aims at positing himself as the hors texte (to use Derrida’s famous 
phrase), as that which is outside the process of symbolization. By remaining an 
16.  John Banville, op. cit., p. 38.
17.  Ibid., p. 167.
18.  Ibid., p. 110.
19.  Ibid., p. 211-12.
20.  Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, Bruce Fink, (trans.), New York, Norton, 2006, p. 
688. 
21.  Lacan defines the Real as “that which subsists outside of symbolization” (Ibid., p. 324). It is the realm of the 
impossible, because it is impossible to signify yet it paradoxically underlies all aspects of our reality. It is the 
unknown kernel of jouissance that needs to be repressed, excluded, so that “reality” becomes possible. In this 
sense, in Lacan’s terminology the Real is distinct from reality. The Imaginary is the third register of the Laca-
nian triadic model and consists of images, ones that regulate one’s sense of self by mediating his/her interac-
tions with the self as well as others. 
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unnamed entity that lacks positive existence—so long as existence is only possible 
via the Symbolic—the narrator seeks unmediated being, but the price he has to 
pay is that he becomes a spectre. This is illustrated very well by Axel’s counter-
part, Alexander Cleave in Eclipse where Cleave notices Axel’s paradoxically absent 
presence:  “at the core of it all there is an absence, an empty space where once 
there was something, or someone, who has removed himself ”22. In what follows, 
I attempt to examine the strategies Axel Vander implements to resolve the predi-
cament of his lack of presence through a creative recourse to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
philosophy.
•  The Nietzschean option
I have begun to feel that I am falling off myself, that my suety old flesh 
is melting off my skeleton and soon will all be gone. I shall not mind; I 
shall be glad; I shall rise up then, bared of inessentials, all gleaming bone 
and sinew smooth as candle wax, new, unknown, my real self at last23.
This key passage illustrates how Axel’s quest for a stable core of selfhood 
independent from his incompatible body leads to a dualism of body and mind 
reminiscent of Descartes’s cogito. In contrast to the depiction of the body as a 
troublesome extension, the “I” is emphatically reiterated several times, rendering 
the dualism all the more explicit. For Descartes, while the nature of corporeal 
substance is constituted by material extension, the mind is made of non-physi-
cal substance. However, while Descartes famously uses the example of wax24 to 
demonstrate the necessity for an independent mind to ascertain its “nature”, Axel 
takes wax as an analogy for both his body as well as his self. On the one hand, his 
disintegrating body, his flesh, is “melting” like candle wax. By melting the wax of 
corporeality, then, Axel hopes to rid himself of the inessentiality that it represents 
in an attempt to attain the true essence of his self beyond (or beneath the cover 
of ) the body. On the other hand, he considers the formlessness of melted wax as 
a metaphor for the self he is hoping to find, the original “smooth” self that has 
not been yet hardened into a shape. In this sense, although Axel distances himself 
from deconstruction by assuming the existence of the essential self, he does not 
fully subscribe to a fully-fledged Cartesian dualism in order to ascertain its nature. 
Instead, by using the same metaphor for both (the self and the body) he arguably 
seeks to redefine the relationship between the two, to find a relationship that is 
not based on a binary opposition (mind/body) but, rather, based on the inter-rela-
22.  John Banville, Eclipse, London, Picador, 2000, p. 211.
23.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 8.
24.  René Descartes, Méditations Métaphysiques, Marc Soriano (eds.), Paris, Larousse, 1950, p. 39-41.
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tability of the two. This adds a new dimension to Axel’s perception of his body as 
it is no longer viewed as merely dysfunctional and incompatible, but, instead, it 
reveals a potential for the disclosure of the self.
This is arguably a Nietzschean move on Axel’s part. In Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche’s prophet defines the self as “a mighty commander, an unknown wise 
man”, an entity stemming from the body and not an abstract consciousness above 
it: “’I,’ you say, and are proud of this word. But the greater thing […] is your 
body and its big reason: it does not say ‘I,’ it does ‘I’”25. The self for Nietzsche 
has the capacity to transcend the ego precisely because it does not discard the 
body, but embraces it. The form of selfhood Nietzsche vouches for is not a meta-
physical “I” or a transcendental subject. In other words, it is not a True self that 
can be excavated from underneath false appearances. In fact, the “I” and the self 
for Nietzsche do not constitute the same thing. The former is an illusion, which 
comes to be created as an effect of the processes of perception and interpretation 
(which are not mutually exclusive for Nietzsche). The “I,” says Nietzsche, “only 
contains an interpretation of the event and does not belong to the event itself ”26. 
The self, in contrast, is constituted as a result of one’s acknowledgement and 
exploration of a potential creativity. It is, for Nietzsche, not the equivalent of 
the mind but rather a conglomeration of one’s physiological perceptions that are 
constantly subject to change not to say transformation. It is not solely based on 
a set of mental activity that produces consciousness, nor is it an essential, unique 
core of selfhood, but “is, rather, a multiplicity”, “an assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements for which the word ‘body’ must stand as a rather attenuated and insuffi-
cient summary”27. Axel, on the one hand, “believe[s],” “insist[s]” that “there is no 
essential, singular self ”28. On the other hand, he is unable to “rid [himself ] of the 
conviction of an enduring core of selfhood”29. In this sense, Nietzsche’s idea (that 
relying on one’s ability of creativity, the self can be formed, made, by incorpora-
ting the bodily dimension) provides Axel with a way out of the deadlock. Smith 
remarks that “[b]ehind the pose, Vander truly yearns for the restoration of the 
essential value,” and his narrative is the “fetishization of the ‘Idea’ that is asserted 
in Shroud, as the assertion of the ideal over the corporal”30. Yet, in parallel to his 
idealization of the self over the body, I argue, in likening his “real self ” as well 
25.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, Thomas Wayne (trans.), New York, 
Algora Publishing, 2003, p. 25.
26.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990, p. 48.
27.  Peter. R Sedgwick, Nietzsche: The Key Concepts, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 140.
28.  John Banville, op. cit., p. 286.
29.  Ibid., p. 27.
30.  Eoghan Smith, op. cit.
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as his “bone and sinew” to the smoothness (i.e. malleability) of “candle wax”31 
Axel effectuates a transition from the quest for the ideal self to an exploration of 
selfhood accessible only through corporeality: Cass observes how Axel smells of 
“candle wax”32, evoking the idea that his body is literally transformed into it.
Axel uses a similar set of adjectives to describe the “enduring” resilience of his 
self33, on the one hand, and the resilience of the eye as a bodily organ: “the eyeball 
is one of the toughest, most resilient muscles in the human body”34. In this light 
one can discern the interrelation of the body and the self in a rereading of the 
actor’s mask in Attic drama:
The white clay from which [the mask] was fashioned has turned to 
the shade and texture of bone […] He takes to wearing the mask at 
home, when no one is there. It is a comfort, it sustains him; he finds it 
wonderfully restful, it is like being asleep and yet conscious. Then one 
day he comes to the table wearing it. His wife makes no remark, his 
children stare for a moment, then shrug and go back to their accustomed 
bickering. He has achieved his apotheosis. Man and mask are one35.
The white colour of clay merges with the similar colour of bone and the mask 
acquires the contours, the shape of the face, becoming indistinguishable from it. 
Traditionally, the function of a mask is to conceal a discrepancy, a difference that, 
albeit temporarily hidden, remains. Yet, what is evoked in the imagery above is 
a sense in which the mask and the face (the body) merge. That is to say, insofar 
as one takes the mask as Axel’s metaphor for his identity, this means he is aiming 
at bridging the gap between the Symbolic (identity) and the Real (of the body), 
hoping to resolve the incongruence between the two. In fact, this passage in part 
stages the way Nietzsche relates mask and truth:
there is not only deceit behind a mask – there is so much goodness in 
craft […] A man who has depths in his shame meets his destiny and his 
delicate decisions upon paths which few ever reach, and with regard to 
the existence of which his nearest and most intimate friends may be igno-
rant […] [He] insists that a mask of himself shall occupy his place in the 
hearts and heads of his friends […] Every profound spirit needs a mask36.
Nietzsche’s seemingly paradoxical claim—that the mask does not so much 
hide a truthful self as offers the possibility of creating a profoundness of self 
31.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 8.
32.  Ibid., p. 185.
33.  Ibid., p. 27.
34.  Ibid., p. 292.
35.  Ibid., p. 286-7.
36.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., p. 34-5.
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through simulation—is part of his overall toppling of the traditional privileging 
of truthful reality over apparent superficiality. In Nietzsche’s terms, there is no 
truth to be discovered by unveiling the shroud, or the mask, but rather, all one 
can peer through it is another mask, another shroud. Truth is but the effect of 
the masking act, posited as a result of it. Profundity of selfhood, then, is not to 
be sought in removing the mask but, on the contrary, in elaborating it: “around 
every profound spirit there continually grows a mask, owing to the constantly 
false, that is to say, SUPERFICIAL [sic] interpretation of every word he utters, 
every step he takes, every sign of life he manifests”37. Axel admittedly engages in 
the Nietzschean celebration of the façade: “I had made myself adept at appea-
ring deeply learned”38. In his writing as a literary critic he always demonstrates an 
elaborate “prose style” rather than “grasp of theory” and “scholarship”39. What is 
more, after admitting to having stolen the name “Axel Vander,” the narrator never 
discloses his real name throughout the novel. His reluctance in disclosing his real 
name is to be read as his attempt to make his mask, that is, his artistic poses and 
articulate style, his signature.
According to John Kenny, by evoking the Shroud on multiple occasions Axel 
seeks to “identif[y] himself directly with Christ and Nietzsche” “through the 
Shroud”40. I claim it is not so much Christ that Axel wants to identify with as it 
is with the Shroud (of Turin) itself. This is emphasized when a mysterious “red-
haired fellow”41 repeatedly says to him something that “sounded like signore”42. He 
later refigures, again calling him “signore”43. At the same time, reminded by Kris-
tina that the Shroud’s other name is sindone, Axel’s memory readjusts and he rea-
lizes that what the red-haired man had actually said was “sindone, not signore”44. 
Axel refers to the man as “the punster”45, emphasizing the way in which signore 
(mister) becomes a pun for sindone (the shroud). The equation of the two in 
Axel’s perception evokes a sense in which he is one and the same as the shroud 
(mask). In other words, like the Attic thespian, he too achieves his “apotheosis”, 
the culmination of his aesthetic self-recreation. Elsewhere, Axel admits: “There is 
not a sincere bone in the entire body of my text”46. The metaphor of the text as 
a body underlines two points. Firstly, it illustrates the textuality of the body, that 
is, just as the text can be likened to a body, the body itself is constructed tex-
37.  Ibid., p. 35.
38.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 60.
39.  Ibid., p. 61.
40.  John Kenny, op. cit., p. 174.
41.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 47.
42.  Ibid., p. 48.
43.  Ibid., p. 287.
44.  Ibid., p. 156.
45.  Ibid., p. 287.
46.  Ibid., p. 329.
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tually (linguistically, metaphorically). Secondly, the text as a body (and the body 
as a text) highlights Axel’s own role as the writer of the body-text. That is to say, 
insofar as he is the writer of his self-representation, his function is irreducible in 
the type of body-text that is represented in his account. He is its creator.
Under the Nietzschean imperative, Axel heeds his bodily calls: “Headaches, 
stomach cramps, a constant churning in the gut, these were the body's protests 
at the insupportable strain of living always in fear”47. The word “protests” indi-
cates Axel’s view of his body as an entity to be reckoned with, as a force that 
exerts a power on him that he cannot neglect. What is more, Axel’s immediate 
relationship with the world is regulated by sensory feelings rather than intellec-
tual reasoning. He speaks of experiencing “the sense of being sealed off from the 
world”48, he has “the sense of [Cass] spinning on her toes”49, and feels “a sense 
of splendour and communion”50. He further emphasizes the physical, sensory 
nature of his experience when he links the word “sense” to smell: “I have a sense 
of something torpid, brownish, exhausted; the smell is the smell of re-breathed 
air”51. Axel’s emphasis on the senses (as the faculty by which the body perceives 
an external stimulus and not the faculty of meaning and understanding) resonates 
with Nietzsche’s attack of the ascetic ideal. The latter, says Nietzsche, is opposed 
to the world of becoming governed by bodily senses that should be favoured over 
“reason” since the senses “do not lie at all52.” That which lies is what one “make[s] 
of their testimony”, a “falsification” that could lead “the lie of unity, the lie of 
thinghood, of substance, of permanence”53.
The Nietzschean overtones of Axel’s enunciations are in congruence with the 
philosopher’s presence throughout the novel. Pier Paulo Piciucco gives a detailed 
account of the relationship between Axel’s narrative and the city of Turin where 
“the figure of Frederick Nietzsche” presents a “powerful picture that contributes 
to both the making of Axel Vander and to his strong connection with the city of 
Turin” and sees Shroud as “a fertile soil where allusions, references and connec-
tions with the German philosopher mushroom”54. Kenny, in his turn, proposes 
47.  Ibid., p. 224-5.
48.  Ibid., p. 36.
49.  Ibid., p. 52.
50.  Ibid., p. 73.
51.  Ibid., p. 205.
52.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth (Trans.), London, 
Penguin, 1990, p. 2.
53.  Ibid., “‘Reason’,” says Nietzsche, “is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses” (Ibid.). Ni-
etzsche, here, is making a case for his idea that “The ‘apparent’ world is the only one; the ‘true’ world is merely 
added by a lie” By emphasizing sensuality over reason Nietzsche directs his attack on Platonic metaphysics that 
fundamentally distinguishes between appearance and reality (Ibid.).
54.  Pier Pauo Piucucco,  “Thus Spoke Axel Vander. Pictures of Turin in John Banville’s Shroud”, in L’immagine 
dell’Italia nelle Letterature Angloamericane e Postcoloniali, Paolo Bertinetti (Eds.), Trauben, Edizioni Trauben, 
2014, p. 57-72.
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that the fact Axel is “one-eyed” “may be a partial reference to ‘the Cyclops of 
culture,’ the frightful energies that Friedrich Nietzsche, the ghost that haunts the 
novel, argued were the innovators for humanity [sic]”55. Piciucco convincingly 
links Kenny’s observation to the way Axel represents his uncommonly large “size 
and stature” that at times transforms him into “a gigantic creature of mythical 
dimensions”56. Axel’s unusually large mass, Piciucco notes, is reminiscent of, or 
a variation on, Nietzsche’s famous Übermensch. Yet, despite his sound analyses, 
Piciucco’s emphasis on other aspects of the relationship between Shroud and Turin 
limits his analysis of the significance of Nietzsche’s Overman in Banville’s novel.
•  Overman as going over
Axel meets a “doctor” in Turin whose name “sounded like Zoroaster”57, a 
reference to Nietzsche’s text, Thus Spake Zarathustra, in which the philosopher 
introduces and discusses in detail the idea of the Overman as the culmination 
of his life-affirmative philosophy, a being free from reactive beliefs and ressenti-
ment58. As Lee Spinks remarks, Übermensch, on the one hand, signifies Overman 
“in the sense of height and self-transformation,” that is, “the elevation of man-
kind’s highest self into an experience of being that has no trace of moralism or 
the fiction of free will59.” On the other hand, Over- “can also suggest ‘across’ or 
‘beyond’ and Nietzsche employs this second resonance to characterize ‘man’ as a 
bridge we must pass across toward a life free of ressentiment and negativity”60. This 
is why the Overman’s key feature, according to Nietzsche, lies in crossing, “going 
over”:
Man is a rope suspended between animal and Superman—a rope over 
an abyss. A dangerous going-over, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous 
looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and standing still. What is great 
about man is that he is a bridge, not an end: what can be loved about 
man is that he is a going-over and a going-under61.
55.  John Kenny, op. cit., p. 163.
56.  Pier Pauo Piucucco, op. cit., p. 66.
57.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 288.
58.  Ressentiment is Nietzsche’s term for the nihilistic, rancorous attitude manifested by the weak as a result of 
their incapability to punish the strong. The weak (or the slave, as Nietzsche liked to put it), in turn, engage 
in “imaginary revenge” in order to make up for their incompetence (On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, 
Carol Diethe (trans.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 21). For Nietzsche, the figure of the 
priest is the ultimate manifestation of ressentiment that incessantly propagates Sklavenmoral (slave morality). 
59.  Lee Spinks, Friedrich Nietzsche, London, Routledge, 2003. p. 120.
60.  Ibid.
61.  Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, op. cit., p. 9.
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Nietzsche’s idea of the self ’s crossing over is evident in Axel’s narrative on mul-
tiple occasions. At the beginning of his narrative, on the day he receives Cass’s 
premonitory letter, he
had the certain sense of having crossed, of having been forced to cross, 
an invisible frontier, and of being in a state that forever more would be 
post-something, would be forever an afterwards. The letter, of course, 
was the crossing point62.
Though the words “afterwards” and “post-something” conjure up the 
Nietzschean transformation in which man moves forward, advances to the 
Overman, the fact that it is the content of Cass’s letter threatening to reveal his 
rogue past that causes the crossing over, the movement is rather backwards. That 
is to say, he crosses over to the realm of the spectral past in which his old demons 
come back to haunt him. As a result of this passage, he is “cloven” between what 
“I had been before the letter arrived” and “this new I, a singular capital standing 
at a tilt to all the known things that had suddenly become unfamiliar”63. The 
transformation results, not only in his uncanny bifurcation, but in the tilting, 
sloping, hence, a destabilized sense of self emphasized by the italicization (i.e. the 
literal tilt) of the second “I.” Elsewhere, “[t]he corner of the square with the plane 
trees”, Axel’s says, “was the crossing point from my world into” the world of the 
real Vander64. What is emphasized in the description is not so much the process of 
the self ’s crossing over, nor is it the other side, as it is the very site where the cros-
sing takes place: “When I think of that spot the weather in it is always grey, the 
luminous, quicksilver grey of an early northern spring, the colour for me of the 
past itself [emphasis added]”65.
In the description above, the passage from the narrator’s identity to that of 
Vander takes place “on the corner.” The word “corner” intriguingly figures repeti-
tively throughout the narrative. To cite a few examples, Axel sees someone “sitting 
hunched at the corner of a table”66; he goes to a “flower seller” located “at the sunlit 
corner”67; he “had to stop at a street corner to consult the crumpled map” while 
he “registered the girl, on the corner opposite, looking in my direction”68; and in 
his youth, he used to live a “corner basement room”69. Even Cass is depicted as 
62.  John Banville, Shroud, op. cit., p. 12-13.
63.  Ibid., p. 13.
64.  Ibid., p. 201.
65.  Ibid.
66.  Ibid., p. 42.
67.  Ibid., p. 43.
68.  Ibid., p. 52.
69.  Ibid., p. 55.
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“hiding in the corner of a couch”70 and “sitting at a table in a cramped corner by 
the window”71. Insofar as a corner is seen as an angle where two sides or edges 
meet, it connotes a spatial border, a crossing point from one space into another. 
Therefore, by systematically representing himself—as well as his perceptual field—
taking place at a corner, Axel shows how he is liminally stuck between two spaces, 
at the very edge of two worlds without quite pertaining to either. “For the most 
part,” Axel says, “I was kept firmly off at the outer edge of things”72. The passive 
voice Axel uses in his enunciation evokes the sense of him being forced into the 
marginal position, as if a force was keeping him “firmly” at bay, away from acces-
sing “things.” The sense of being forced is further emphasized when Axel uses the 
word edge as a verb again in the passive voice when he remembers his late wife 
Magda: “I felt I was being edged around by a large, wary ruminant”73. Indeed, the 
very word corner can evoke such a sense as in to be cornered, that is, to be pushed 
into a position by force. In a sense, one can argue, Axel’s metaphors of liminality 
primarily highlight his lack of direct access to the “real” thing, indicating that his 
access to truth is barred by a force beyond him. Being cornered to the edge, so to 
speak, illustrates his perceptual (and representational) predicament. In this sense, 
Axel transforms Nietzsche’s metaphors for man as “rope” and “bridge” into man in 
corners and edges. Banville arguably provides a variation on the philosopher’s idea 
of Overman, presenting an in-between-man. As to what this move on Banville’s 
part represents in terms of his overall aesthetics, a brief detour through Alenka 
Zupančič’s reading of Nietzsche is illuminating.
In The Shortest Shadow, Zupančič identifies two fundamental, philosophical 
positions with regards to the Real. On the one hand, there is “the classical or 
metaphysical position,” according to which, the Real is posited as “the mate-
rial basis or a touchstone” for speech74. On the other hand, there is “the so-cal-
led ‘sophistic’ position” that aims at dismissing “the very notion of the Real,” 
advocating the idea that “‘speech is all,’ that the Real does not exist, that it all 
comes down to a question of conventions, different language games, different 
perspectives and interpretations”75. Nietzsche’s writing, says Zupančič, offers a 
third stance that surpasses the aforementioned “couple”; it is based on “a speci-
fic duality”76, one that is “perhaps best articulated in the topology of the edge as 
70.  Ibid., p. 93.
71.  Ibid., p. 144.
72.  Ibid., p. 211.
73.  Ibid., p. 18.
74.  Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2003, 
p. 12.
75.  Ibid., p. 12.
76.  Zupančič emphasizes, it is “a duality that has nothing to do with the dichotomies between complementary 
oppositional terms (which are ultimately always two sides of the One): this duality is not (yet) multiplicity 
either” (Ibid., p. 12). 
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the thing whose sole substantiality consists in its simultaneously separating and 
linking two surfaces”77. Zupančič claims that Nietzsche’s specific articulation of 
duality as edge distinguishes his thinking from both the “realist” and “nominalist” 
positions in that it proposes a fresh position regarding the relationship between 
representation and reality since it brings to the equation the role of the Lacanian 
Real. Insofar as the Real is not reducible to reality, and insofar as reality itself is 
constituted through a fantasmatic scenario, that is, as a specific configuration of 
the Real-Symbolic-Imaginary, the traditional binary opposition between reality 
and illusion no longer presents a sufficient framework to distinguish truth from 
untruth. At the same time, insofar as the Real does exist, or, rather, subsists 
(though as an impossibility, as a limit), total dismissal of anything beyond textua-
lity (and linguistic construction) misses the role of the Real. Nietzsche’s concep-
tion of duality as edge, according to Zupančič, “suggests that the Real exists as 
the internal fracture or split of representation, as its intrinsic edge on account of 
which representation never fully coincides, not simply with its object, but with 
itself ”78. Ultimately, “what is designated as ‘beyond good and evil’” is located at 
this edge. It is “a beyond that is not really a realm, and is thus not a ‘beyond’ in 
the common sense of this term, but rather, has the structure of an edge”79.
If one agrees with Zupančič’s reading, one can postulate that Banville’s 
Nietzschean turn in Shroud does not so much lie in his multifarious, anecdotal 
references to the philosopher throughout the novel (and throughout his oeuvre), 
but it arguably lies in constantly situating his narrator on edge, at an edge, that 
is, within a specific distance from the Real where he periodically comes across 
the impossibility of a truthful self-representation while simultaneously insisting 
on the existence of truth. Shroud is a sophisticated dialogue with the deadlock 
outlined by deconstruction, a dialogue supplemented by a Nietzschean subtext in 
order to locate, to lay bare, the inherent points of impossibility at the heart of 
representation rather than a mere illustration of that impossibility. The edges and 
corners at which Axel constantly finds himself are, in a way, the contours of his 
subjective frame. They are the spatial tropes for Banville’s mise en scene of his nar-
rator’s perceptual as well as representational crisis.
77.  Ibid.
78.  Ibid., p. 28.
79.  Ibid., p. 17.
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The Queen’s two bodies: Panti at the Abbey
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Abstract
This article reads Panti’s Noble Call at the Abbey theatre on 1 February 2014 in the light 
of Didier Eribon’s work on the experience of insult as constitutive of gay subjectivity. However, 
it goes on to argue that Panti’s narrated experience of stigma, internalised shame and failed 
self-discipline also reflects the young Irish postcolonial nation’s self-imposed task of performing 
heteronormative modernity. The drag queen’s performance, turning shame into exhibitionism, 
points to alternative ways of performing Irishness which reconnect with traditional, non-
modern forms of Irish performative practices. 
Keywords: Panti, Abbey, shame, insult, performance, body.
Résumé
Cet article propose une lecture de la performance de Panti sur la scène de l’Abbey Theatre le 1er 
février 2014 à la lumière du travail de Didier Eribon sur l’insulte comme expérience constitutive 
de la subjectivité gay. Il suggère que l’histoire de Panti, qui parle de stigmatisation, de honte inté-
riorisée et de son échec à discipliner son corps selon la norme hétérosexuelle, ne reflète pas seulement 
une expérience spécifiquement homosexuelle, mais fait aussi écho à la performance de la modernité 
hétéronormative à laquelle est confrontée l’ensemble des membres de la jeune nation irlandaise post-
coloniale. La performance de la drag queen, qui renverse la honte en exhibitionnisme, montre qu’il 
existe d’autres manières de jouer l’Irlandicité, et renoue ainsi avec des pratiques performatives irlan-
daises traditionnelles qui n’ont pas trouvé leur place dans la modernité hétéronormée. 
Mots-clés : Panti, Abbey, honte, insulte, performance, corps.
This article is part of a fledgling project that tries to connect notions of shame, 
queer identities, postcolonial identities and performance. It is grounded in the 
substantial and growing body of queer theory and queer activism which has been 
engaged in an effort to resignify shame not just as a normative force of social 
regulation and censorship, but also as a potentially liberating emotion capable of 
releasing creativity and of providing an impetus for theatrical self-(re)construc-
tion. One point of origin was Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s oft-quoted article “Shame, 
Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James’ The Art of the Novel”, 
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first published in 1993 in GLQ: A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies1 and repu-
blished in David Halperin and Valerie Traub’s 2009 edited volume Gay Shame. 
Other landmark publications which look at a specifically Irish context include 
Sally Munt’s Queer Attachments: The Cultural Politics of Shame (2009)2, and more 
recently Joe Valente’s article “Self-Queering Ireland” in the “Queering Ireland” 
issue of the Canadian Journal of Irish Studies in 20103. In this article I return to a 
well-known piece of queer Irish autobiographical performance, one which occur-
red on the stage of the national theatre but was captured on video and, as the 
hackneyed phrase goes, “went viral” in 2014: Panti’s “Noble call” at the Abbey 
theatre4, in the wake of the public scandal known as “Pantigate”. What, I ask, is 
the particular significance of this queer Irish autobiographical performance? What 
work does it perform within Irish culture? To continue with clichés, I suggest that 
the drag queen’s performance on the Abbey stage holds a (facetiously distorting) 
mirror to the nation, that under cover of being “about” the intimate, subjective 
experience of internalised shame which is constitutive of queer identity, it also 
says something both disturbing and liberating about the performative nature of 
heterosexuality.
The context of Panti’s performance needs to be recalled briefly. In January 
2014, in the midst of the campaign for marriage equality, Rory O’Neill, perfor-
mer and gay rights “accidental activist”, as he defines himself, best known as his 
drag persona Panti, was invited to appear on RTE’s popular talk-show Saturday 
Night Live, hosted by Brendan O’Connor. When asked to comment on his expe-
rience as a gay man in contemporary Ireland, O’Neill said he considered certain 
prominent people in the media and political circles to be homophobic. After the 
show those who had been named, including high profile Irish Times reporter John 
Waters, threatened both RTE and O’Neill with legal action, prompting RTE to 
edit that part of the interview from the RTE archive, to issue a public apology and 
to pay out some 85000 € to offended parties, thus, as Fintan Walsh comments, 
“effectively imply[ing] that homophobia could not be called out in public”5. 
While traditional media in Ireland barely documented the event, the story was 
widely shared by the social media and evolved into a global furore which became 
known as “Pantigate”. These events, in January 2014, coincided with the begin-
1.  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James’ The Art of the Novel”, 
GLQ: A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies, Vol. 1-1, 1993, p. 1-16. Republished in David. M. Halperin and 
Valerie Traub (eds.), Gay Shame, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, p. 49-62.
2.  Sally Munt, Queer Attachments: The Cultural Politics of Shame, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007.
3.  Joseph Valente: “Self-Queering Ireland”, Queering Ireland, special issue of The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, 
Sean Kennedy (ed.), 2010, p. 25-44. 
4.  The performance can be seen online at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXayhUzWnl0]. Accessed 18 Feb-
ruary 2018.
5.  Fintan Walsh, Queer Performance and Contemporary Ireland: Dissent and Disorientation, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2016, ebook [1043].
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ning of the decade of commemorations of the revolutionary events which led to 
the independence of Ireland a hundred years ago. One early celebration was the 
production at the Abbey of James Plunkett’s 1958 play The Risen People which 
chronicles the Dublin Lockout of 1913. After each performance, the cast invited 
a surprise guest to give a “Noble Call” in the form of a short address reflecting 
on the play’s relevance to the state of contemporary Ireland. On the night of the 
play’s final performance on 1 February 2014, three weeks after Rory O’Neil’s 
appearance on Saturday Night Live, Panti was invited to give her Noble Call, and 
she gave a resonant speech in response to “Pantigate”, drawing on her own expe-
rience of homophobia in Ireland and exposing the redoubled violence inherent in 
the attempt to silence anyone who dares to speak of homophobia in the public 
sphere. The speech was greeted with a standing ovation, and the video hit the 
internet and achieved instant, massive success. How instrumental it was to the 
eventual success of the Equality campaign can only be a matter of speculation; 
but I want to suggest that it also works at another level, not just as a (brilliantly 
effective) piece of gay rights activism, but also as a sympathetic comment on the 
performative nature of what has become known, after Adrienne Rich, as “compul-
sory heterosexuality”6.
When she is called on the stage at the end of the performance, Panti appears in 
a fur-lined, high-necked burgundy dress in the usual high heels and curly blonde 
wig, towering above the rest of the cast who stand behind her on the Abbey stage 
in their 1913 workers’ costumes. She then introduces herself, redundantly making 
sure that everyone in the audience is aware of the constructed nature of her 
gender: “Hello, my name is Panti, and for the benefice of the visually impaired 
or incredibly naïve, I am a drag-queen”. What produces both a certain epistemo-
logical anxiety and the unique performative strength of the Noble Call is that the 
rest of the performance proceeds as if this was Rory, rather than Panti, telling very 
intimate stories of his experience of homophobia as a gay man in contemporary 
Ireland. Though she is, in her own words, “painfully middle class” and has never 
experienced the “abject, grinding poverty” represented in the play, she feels legi-
timate to give a speech about “oppression” because, she says, “I do know what it 
feels like to be put in my place”—an important phrase that I’ll return to shortly.
The speech starts with the evocation of a foundational, traumatic yet banal 
event, to which Panti relentlessly returns subsequently—the story of how she once 
stood at a pedestrian crossing and was abused by a “bunch of lads” in a passing 
car:
6.  Cf. Adrienne Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence”, in Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected 
Prose 1979-1985, New York, Norton, 1986, p. 23-75. 
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Have you ever been standing at a pedestrian crossing when a car goes 
by, and in it are a bunch of lads, and they lean out of the window as 
they go by, and they shout “Fag!” and throw a milk carton at you? Now, 
it doesn’t really hurt. I mean, it’s just a wet carton, and in many ways, 
they’re right: I am a fag. So it doesn’t hurt, but it feels oppressive. And 
when it really does hurt is afterwards. Because it’s afterwards that I won-
der and worry and obsess over, what was it about me? What did they see 
in me? What was it that gave me away? And I hate myself for wondering 
that. It feels oppressive. And the next time I’m standing at a pedestrian 
crossing, I hate myself for it, but I check myself to see what is it about 
me that gives the gay away. And I check myself to make sure that I’m not 
doing it this time.
Then she goes on to evoke other banal experiences of homophobia, but always 
returns to this crucial moment: “but the next time I stand at a pedestrian crossing, 
I hate myself for it, but I check myself.” The pedestrian crossing thus becomes the 
metonymic space of trauma, instantly inducing feelings of fear, shame and inter-
nalised self-hate, and a reflex of self-discipline. In his 1999 book Insult and the 
Making of the Gay Self (transl. 2004)7, Didier Eribon argues that the experience 
of being insulted is an inevitable and crucial part of the identity-making process 
of gays and lesbians; that it is in fact, by necessity, a foundational experience: “It 
all begins with an insult”, he claims (15). An insult, he goes on to argue, does 
not aim to convey any informative content, to tell me anything about myself, 
but aims only “to hurt me, to mark my consciousness with that hurt, inscribing 
shame in the deepest levels of my mind.” (16) In doing this the insult pins me 
down and tells me where I belong in the social hierarchy: “Insult is a linguistic act 
— or a series of repeated linguistic acts by which a particular place in the world is 
assigned to the person at whom the acts are directed.” (16) Panti’s speech captures 
both the foundational character of insult and its performative, place-assigning 
power: “I do know what it feels like to be put in my place”. The scene is made 
brilliantly real with a few, vivid touches: the vulnerable space of the pedestrian 
crossing, the untroubled masculinity of the “young lads” in the car, the grotesque 
choice of projectile—a “wet carton of milk”—with its humiliating connotations 
of abject femininity, limpness and wasted fluids, and the monosyllabic insult 
that defines and confines: “Fag!” But the reason why the speech is so resonant is 
that the isolated incident is metonymic of the constant exposure to insult which 
LGBT people suffer. As Eribon points out, “Insult can be found anywhere: lin-
guists have expanded this category of performative utterances to include allusions, 
7.  Didier Eribon: Insult and the Making of the Gay Self, transl. Michael Lucey, Durham (NC): Duke University 
Press, 2004. 
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insinuations, irony, metaphor, and so on.” (16) In fact, he argues persuasively, the 
stigmatising, place-assigning power of insult pervades the whole structure of lan-
guage, which is always already shaped by heterosexual prejudice:
Thus do gay people live in a world of insults. They are surrounded 
by a language that hems them in and points them out. The world insults 
them; it speaks of them and of what is said about them. The words of 
day-to-day life as well as of psychiatric, juridical, and political discourse 
assign each of them individually and all of them collectively to an inferior 
place within the social order. And yet this very language preceded them: 
the world of insults preexisted them, and it takes hold of them even 
before they know what they are. (56)
Insult is foundational in the constitution of LGBT identity because it precedes 
the emergence of the self: it is always already there, in the very texture of the lan-
guage with which I will apprehend the world around me and articulate a sense of 
who I am. Having related the “pedestrian crossing” incident Panti goes on to give 
other instances of feeling “oppressed.” Each story starts with the anaphoric phrase 
“Have you ever”, which makes the point that the experience of an audience which 
can reasonably be assumed to be largely straight, however sympathetic to LGBT 
people, diverges radically from the lived experience of insult which is constitutive 
of LGBT subjectivity. Her other examples include being the object of a whole 
range of “expert” discourses and uninformed yet publicly expressed opinion, tra-
velling on a crowded bus with her best friend and cringing because he is “being 
so gay”, and being aware at all times that in other countries LGBT people may 
be beaten up, imprisoned and even killed for being what she is. Every story thus 
reveals the homophobic violence at work in the very fabric of LGBT experience, a 
violence of which the foundational incident of the pedestrian crossing is only the 
most visible and quintessential manifestation.
Obsessively, Panti returns to the traumatic incident, and to her subsequent 
attempt to fend off the violence of insult by normalising herself: “I check myself ” 
(in both senses: inspect, and restrain). Life as a gay man is described as a poi-
gnantly ineffective struggle to act straight. Like a Method actor, she submits her 
body to constant training, but the body refuses to be disciplined and always threa-
tens to “give the gay away”. There is one particularly interesting moment in the 
performance, when she is talking about her distressed self-inspection after the 
incident: “what did they see in me, what was it that gave me away?”, and a few 
people in the audience laugh, but with a split second’s lag, and she looks briefly 
unsettled, as if she hadn’t anticipated the laughs here, hadn’t intended this to 
be funny—and indeed it isn’t funny as such: she is talking about a moment of 
extreme anxiety. The reason why some people do laugh, I argue, has to do not 
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with what she is saying but with who is saying it: the man who is telling us that 
he is constantly trying to look as straight as possible, as inconspicuous as possible, 
is wearing high heels, a fur-lined burgundy dress, a Dolly Parton-style wig and 
enough lipstick to paint the Abbey building red. The radical dissonance between 
the performing body and the spoken body, neither of which is a more authentic 
version of Panti/Rory than the other, is a striking metaphor of the impossibility 
of self-adequation which Eribon sees as a characteristic of gay subjectivity. This 
inevitable split is induced by heterosexual domination and the way it pervades 
all social relations and institutions, proclaiming that civilisation itself rests on 
the principle of “sexual difference” and thus relegating same-sex relations out of 
juridical institutions and of cultural intelligibility itself8. Social institutions thus 
“work to establish and to reproduce an uncrossable divide between the norm and 
homosexuality—and another form of self-division within a gay person.” (116) 
Being divided from themselves, LGBT people must therefore strive towards the 
unreachable goal of identity, and embark on a lifelong course of self-fashioning. 
This was perhaps most flamboyantly expressed in Wilde’s determination to make 
his life a work of art, a project taken up by Panti who in her earlier, eloquently 
titled show A Woman in Progress, defined herself as “a big, drunk, devastatin-
gly attractive, theatrical device,” adding in true Wildean fashion: “I am my own 
life’s work. The fruit of my own creative endeavours9.” The buried pun on “fruit” 
facetiously drives home the point that you can never be a “fruit” unless you have 
grown it yourself. Eribon’s analysis of the paradoxically creative effect of insult 
intersects with Sedgwick’s reading of shame as a transformative force intrinsically 
linked with performance:
Shame turns itself skin side out; shame and pride, shame and dignity, 
shame and self-display, shame and exhibitionism are different interli-
nings of the same glove. Shame, it might finally be said, transformatio-
nal shame, is performance. I mean theatrical performance. Performance 
interlines shame as more than just its result or a way of warding it off, 
though, importantly, it is those things. Shame is the affect that mantles 
the threshold between introversion and extroversion, between absorp-
tion and theatricality, between performativity and—performativity. (Gay 
Shame, 51-52)
The performativity of insult, encapsulated in the stigmatising phrase “Shame 
on you!”, makes me cast down my eyes and turn away my face in shame—
8.  French edition: Réflexions sur la question gay (1999), Paris, Flammarion, 2012, p. 176. The passage is omitted 
in English.
9.  Panti, A Woman in Progress, in Queer Notions. New Plays and Performances from Ireland, Fintan Walsh (ed.), 
Cork, Cork University Press, 2010, p. 245.
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it makes me lose face. But in the process it invites me to recreate my face, my 
persona, to perform my chosen, ever inchoate version of who I am or will be. As 
both Sedgwick and Eribon point out, queer identities, anchored as they are in the 
experience of shame, are bound to emerge theatrically, as invisibility is reversed 
into exhibitionism (Eribon 106).
However, what Panti’s Noble Call makes poignantly clear is that there is no 
alternative to theatricality: “Panti” may be a gloriously histrionic “theatrical 
device”, but the other body she conjures up in her speech, the body of the gay 
man who is desperate to act straight, is no less the product of a performance—if 
a failed one. As I suggested earlier, the act of “checking himself ” evokes the disci-
pline of the Stanislavski tradition, or indeed of the sort of restrained naturalism 
which the Fay brothers cultivated in the early days of the Irish Literary Theatre. 
As Adrian Frazier has shown, what became known as “the Abbey style of acting” 
evolved largely as an attempt to counter the perceived vulgarity of the English 
acting tradition, which gave free rein to star actors and tended to encourage ove-
racting and facile, emphatic effects. By contrast, the Fays cultivated ensemble 
rather then solo performances, and imposed a form of gestural minimalism on 
their actors. Frazier quotes the English critic E. C. Montague:
Throughout one half of Lady Gregory’s Rising of the Moon there is 
scarcely a movement: merely that no-one should strut or fret tickles you. 
Miss Maire O’Neill, as Nora, in The Shadow of the Glen, stands almost 
stock still through a scene where most English actresses would pace the 
stage like lionesses in a zoo. The result is that when she does move you can 
see the passion propel her like a screw. In Mr Yeats’s Kathleen ni Houlihan 
the average stage-manager would have thought everything under-acted10.
However, as Lionel Pilkington has argued, this self-imposed discipline 
contrasts not just with English histrionics, but also with alternative Irish perfor-
mative practices which were perceived as incompatible with the modern norms of 
bodily restraint that the Abbey embraced as part of its modernising agenda:
One valuable effect of the naturalistic style of acting championed in 
the 1900s by the Fay brothers, Frank and William, and for which the 
Abbey theatre was so famous, was its presentation of Irish actions and 
forms of behaviour as decorously familiar. […] In striking contrast, for 
example, to the weird gesticulations of a ululating funeral keener, the 
straw-masked performances of a mummer or the grotesque and often 
10.  C.E. Montague, qtd. by Adrian Frazier, “Irish Acting in the Early Twentieth Century”, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Modern Irish Theatre, Nicholas Grene and Chris Morash (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, 
231-45, p. 236.
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crudely sexual and violent indecorousness of a wake game, acting in the 
institutional theatre rendered behaviour that was reassuringly and ins-
tantly recognisable as modern11.
As it achieved a hegemonic status, the Abbey’s embrace of modern norms dele-
gitimised and marginalised those alternative performative traditions which remai-
ned, in David Lloyd’s felicitous phrase, “recalcitrant to modernity”. The bodies 
that were allowed on the Abbey stage were bodies that did not “strut or fret”—
restrained, disciplined bodies, modern bodies—normal bodies. In conjuring up 
her repeatedly failed performance of heterosexuality, however, Panti denaturalises 
the norm and exposes it for what it is: another performance, which depends on 
the painstaking internalisation of dominant codes. Her failed performance, and 
the shame that attends to it, nevertheless produces in return the flamboyant drag 
queen who struts and frets upon the Abbey stage. If “queer” is, as Michael Warner 
defines it, “resistance to regimes of the normal”12, than it could be argued that 
Panti metonymically performs the return of the repressed queer. Inviting the 
Abbey audience to recognise that their (assumed) normality is a performance like 
hers (and one which is just as susceptible to failure), she queers the institutional 
space of the national theatre, and metonymically revives the repressed performa-
tive traditions which resisted absorption into the normalised idioms of modernity.
There is something openly confrontational about the performance: this is not 
confessional theatre, as in most autobiographical performances which rely on the 
creation of a special intimacy between performer and audience (the size of the 
Abbey stage, and the presence of the whole cast of The Risen People, would make 
this very difficult anyway). Rather, at the end of her speech Panti states her belief 
that “almost all of you are probably homophobes” and, evoking yet again her self-
loathing for “checking herself ” at pedestrian crossings, she blurts out, “and some-
times I hate you for doing this to me.” However I would argue that in confron-
ting the audience with her painful story of stigma and internalised shame, she 
offers an empathetic mirror-image of their own perpetual endeavour to perform 
the norm, a task inherent in the project of heterosexuality everywhere but perhaps 
particularly mandatory in a postcolonial context, where the narrative of the young 
nation still needs to be stabilised by an on-going process of policing of bodies. As 
Helen Munt comments in the context of Irish-American nationalism:
The concept or figure of a nation depends upon an account of ‘one-
ness’ that requires by default compulsory heterosexuality. Because hete-
rosexuality is naturalised and assumed, accordingly homosexuality is read 
11.  Lionel Pilkington, Theatre and Ireland, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2010, p. 67.
12.  Michael Warner, “Introduction”, in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, Michael Warner 
(ed.), Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. p. xxvii.
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as antithetical to the nation and its political embodiment within natio-
nalism13.
Finding one’s place within the national narrative is thus dependent on one’s 
ability to perform the heterosexual norm, an arduous task of constant self-poli-
cing to which everyone, not just the impossibly conspicuous gay boy, must submit 
themselves. Yet in confronting the audience not with the shamed body who fails 
to achieve invisibility, but with the most conspicuous body of the drag queen born 
out of this shame, she ushers them, too, towards a liberating performativity which 
needs not be perceived as antithetical to the national narrative, but rather reconnects 
metonymically with a whole body of repressed Irish performative traditions.
13.  Op. cit., p. 56. 
